Case 1｜Qingdao, Panamanian-flag Ro-Ro vessel, detained on three separate occasions

Basic Information :

Vessel Type : Panamanian-flag Ro-Ro cargo ship, GT 4165

Port: Qingdao Dagang Port

Date: 10 September 2026

Cargo for this voyage: winches, loaders, excavators

Deficiency Text :

① THE SHIP CREW WORKING LANGUAGE IS RUSSIAN, BUT A TRANSLATION INTO ENGLISH, FRENCH OR SPANISH FOR CSM NOT PROVIDED ON BOARD (THE CSM WAS ONLY WRITTEN IN RUSSIAN)

船员工作语言为俄语，但船上未提供CSM的英/法/西语译文（CSM仅有俄语版）。代码06101，16。

② THE LASHING INSTRUCTION FOR BULLDOZER AND WHEEL LOADER (WHICH WERE LOADED ON BOARD) NOT PROVIDED IN CSM

CSM中未提供本航次实载的推土机和轮式装载机的绑扎说明。代码06101，17。

③ THE BASE OF TWO D-RING FOUND DAMAGED AND CRACKED ON MAIN DECK, AND ONE LASHING STRAP FOUND DETERIORATED AND BROKEN ON MAIN DECK, NEED TO BE REPLACED

主甲板两个D型环底座破损开裂，一根系固带老化断裂，需更换。代码06104，17。

**PSCReady Detailed Explanation**

Item 1: The PSCO checked the CSM, which was entirely in Russian. The vessel’s entire crew are Russian nationals and Russian is their working language — this in itself is compliant. However, when the PSCO turned to the back cover, there was no translation in English, French or Spanish.

Pursuant to MSC.1/Circ.1353/Rev.2 paragraph 1.2: the working language onboard may be other than these three languages, but a translated copy in one of the three languages must be available on board.

**Rationale**

The PSCO cannot read Russian; neither can the charterer’s surveyor during hold inspection, nor the PSCO at the next port. Statutory documents are not only for the ship’s crew; they shall also be intelligible to the cargo interests.

Entirely in Russian

Item 2: This is a Ro-Ro vessel. The Cargo Securing Manual (CSM) contains detailed lashing diagrams for private cars as well as excavators. When the PSCO went onto the weather deck, he found a tracked bulldozer and a wheeled loader stowed on board. The lashing requirements for these two items were not covered in the manual. The Chief Officer and dock workers stated that these two units were similar to excavators and they lashed them based on experience. The PSCO did not accept this “similarity” argument.

SOLAS Regulation VI/5.6 clearly stipulates that all cargo units, other than solid and liquid bulk cargoes, shall be secured in accordance with the Administration-approved Cargo Securing Manual. A tracked bulldozer has a high centre of gravity, while a loader features a short wheelbase. Their lashing point locations and load bearing characteristics are entirely different from those of an excavator. The CSM is a statutory technical document rather than a reference booklet. Lashing arrangements must be included in the manual for every type of cargo carried. The manual shall be revised whenever the cargo types on the trading route change. This point was not identified during the plan approval by the classification society, and a deficiency of 17 was raised by PSC.

                                                                                                        The tracked bulldozer is **not listed** in the CSM.

Item 3: The PSCO patrolled the weather deck and kicked two D-rings, finding cracked welds. He also inspected a lashing strap whose fibre layer had turned powdery. Section 2.3 of MSC.1/Circ.1353/Rev.2 requires the Master to carry out routine visual inspections. These items were not left unchecked; the inspections performed were ineffective.

                                                                                                             The base of the D-ring could be broken by kicking.

Case 2｜Qingdao, Liberian-flag Container Vessel M, one container overloaded by 0.32 tonnes

Basic Information

Vessel Type: Container ship (keel laid on 6 December 2024, new vessel)

Port: Qingdao Qianwan Port

Date: 14 September 2026

Deficiency Details

Three 40ft high-cube containers with an actual gross weight of 30.8 tonnes each were stowed at BAY 30, TIER 76 on board. The maximum permissible gross mass marked on the container nameplate is 32.5 tonnes. However, in accordance with the vessel’s Container Securing Arrangement (CSA, appendix to the CSM), the maximum allowable mass for a single container at this stowage position is 30.48 tonnes.

This also means there are two loading non-conformities for the vessel:

First, the CSA specifies a maximum allowable mass of 30.48 tonnes per container, while the actual loaded mass is 30.8 tonnes, an excess of 0.32 tonnes.

Second, the container’s rated maximum gross mass shown on its nameplate is 32.5 tonnes, which exceeds the CSA limit of 30.48 tonnes per container.

**PSCReady Detailed Explanation**

This case merits elaboration.

Instead of checking the containers first, the PSCO started by reviewing the CSA and located the entry for BAY30 TIER76, which states the per-container limit of 30.48 tonnes. He then went to the weather deck and checked the container nameplate showing 30.8 tonnes.

Although 0.32 tonnes is a small excess, the CSM is a statutory document. If the document stipulates 30.48 tonnes but 30.80 tonnes is loaded, this constitutes non-compliance.

The keel of this vessel was laid at the end of 2024. Its CSM was prepared by the shipyard as a standard document for the ship series. The stacking weight limits referenced ISO 1496-1:1990, which has long been superseded by ISO 1496-1:2013, with an amendment issued in 2024.

The limit for standard containers remains 30.48 tonnes under the current standard, while heavy-duty containers are permitted up to 36 tonnes. The 32.5-tonne rating shown on nameplates is common in the market. When drafting the manual, the shipyard failed to take into account that the vessel might carry heavy containers rated 32.5 tonnes or 36 tonnes in future trades.

Incorrect manual preparation

The consequence is that the technical requirements in the manual are out of line with actual operational practice. The Chief Officer loaded containers strictly in accordance with the shore stowage plan, unaware that the capacity limit for this slot on his vessel was only 30.48 tonnes. The shore planning team also failed to treat the vessel’s CSA as a binding constraint.

For this case, the manual needs to be revised, and additional heavy-duty lashing gear shall be provided for heavy containers.

Nameplate for heavy container with a maximum permissible gross mass of 32.5 tonnes.

Case 3｜Yantai, Bulk Carrier Vessel X, MSL overstated by 2 tonnes

Basic Information

Vessel Type: Bulk Carrier

Port: Yantai

Date: 15 September 2026

Cargo for this voyage: Self-dumping trucks carried on weather deck

Deficiency Text

CARGO (TRUCK) SECURING ARRANGEMENT(PORTABLE) MSL CALCULATED IN THE CARGO SECURING PLAN NOT CONSISTENT WITH CSM

货物（卡车）便携式系固布置的MSL在系固方案中与CSM不一致。代码06107，17，开航前纠正。

**PSCReady Detailed Explanation**

The vessel carries tipper trucks secured by lashing chains with a breaking strength of 16 tonnes (12 mm diameter chain, type approval certificate on board). Table 1 of Appendix 13 to the vessel’s CSM clearly specifies that the MSL of the chain shall be taken as 50% of its breaking strength. This gives a calculated value of 8 tonnes (78.4 kN).

However, in the lashing calculation sheet submitted by the ship, the MSL was stated as 10 tonnes (98 kN). The Chief Officer explained that the value was rounded for calculation convenience. If the MSL is taken at an inflated higher value, the resulting required number of chains will be reduced. Only using a conservative lower MSL value ensures safety.

Original lashing calculation: MSL = 98 kN (10 t), non-compliant with CSM.

Case 4｜Rizhao, Bulk Carrier Vessel BB, Insufficient Quantity of Securing Equipment

Basic Information

Vessel Type: Bulk Carrier

Port: Rizhao

Date: 4 September 2026

Voyage Cargo: Vehicles and other general cargo stowed on weather deck

Deficiency Details

The vessel’s CSM requires that for the carriage of deck cargo, 140 pcs of deck lashing eyes / clamps, 160 pcs of stoppers and 70 pcs of wire lashings shall be provided.

PSC on-site count: quantities found insufficient.

The ship’s response: This is the first deck cargo operation for this voyage. A port lashing contractor has been engaged to bring securing materials on site; the vessel itself does not carry these items.

Paragraph 1.3.6 of MSC.1/Circ.1353/Rev.2: A sufficient quantity of spare securing devices shall be kept on board.

Paragraph 1.3.5: Any devices referred to in the manual used as replacements shall have a strength not less than that of the devices being replaced. Where alternative securing devices are adopted, the manual shall be amended accordingly.

The requirements specified in the CSM represent the statutory minimum standard. They cannot be substituted by outsourced services, nor can compliance be compromised.

Case 5｜Ningbo, Ultra-large Container Vessel A, Lashing Bridge Spacing Exceeded by 200 mm

Basic Information

Vessel Type: Ultra-large Container Vessel A (keel laid on 22 May 2023, delivered in 2024, new vessel)

Port: Ningbo Meishan International Container Terminal

Date: 17 September 2026

Defective Bay: BAY 66 Hatch Cover

Deficiency Text

THE DISTANCE FROM LASHING BRIDGE FENCING TO CONTAINER STACK ON BAY 66 MORE THAN 1100MM (ABOUT 1300MM)

BAY 66绑扎桥护栏内侧至集装箱堆垛的水平距离超过1100毫米（实测约1300毫米）。代码17，开航前纠正。

**PSCReady Detailed Explanation**

This case differs from the previous four. The first four stemmed from **human non-compliance**, while this one is built into the vessel — an inherent design defect.

How did the PSCO carry out the inspection?

The CSM clearly states that 45ft containers may be stowed on the hatch cover of BAY 66, and the CSAP drawings appear satisfactory. The PSCO climbed onto the lashing bridge. Although only 40ft containers were stacked at this bay, he used a tape measure to take the horizontal distance from the inner side of the lashing bridge guardrail to the container stack: 1300 mm. The regulatory limit is 1100 mm, meaning an excess of 200 mm.

What does 200 mm represent? Roughly the length of a forearm. What does this 200 mm excess imply? It means when crew stand on the lashing bridge to fit twistlocks and release lashing baskets, they have to lean out to reach the containers. Working at height, swayed by wind or unstable footing, the crew are exposed at an altitude of 30 metres. This is not an issue of securing strength; it is a life-critical access and working passage issue.

SOLAS Regulation VI/5 sets out the general provisions. Chapter 5 of MSC.1/Circ.1353/Rev.2 requires container ships with keel laid on or after 1 January 2015 to carry a CSAP (Cargo Safe Access Plan). The dimensional requirement is specified in Paragraph 6.2.2.1.1 of Annex 14 to the CSS Code (MSC.1/Circ.1352/Rev.1): the horizontal working distance from the securing point to the container, at lashing bridge locations, shall be no less than 220 mm and no more than 1100 mm. Item C1 in the dimension table explicitly states the measurement shall be taken from the inner face of the guardrail.

The vessel’s Cargo Securing Manual (CSM) was just approved in January 2024 in accordance with the latest guidelines, yet such a defect exists.

Why was deficiency code 17 raised instead of code 30?

Because the PSCO ordered the ship to shift all 40ft containers from BAY 66 and clear the bay on the same day. After on-site re-verification with no non-conformity found, the vessel was allowed to sail.

However, this is only a temporary fix. Permanent rectification requires docking at a shipyard: the guardrail of the lashing bridge shall be extended outwards, or modified to a removable type. When stowing 45ft containers, the guardrail is secured at the inner position; when stowing 40ft containers, the guardrail is moved outwards and secured to meet the distance requirement.

BAY 66 fully cleared, vessel released.

Shipowners are alerted: any bay where the hatch cover is designed for 45ft containers but routinely loaded with 40ft containers carries a high risk of this non-conformity. Masters shall promptly arrange for the Chief Officer to measure locations similar to BAY 66 on board with a tape measure. Where the distance is insufficient, either adjust the stowage plan to avoid using this bay, or modify the guardrail during the next dry-docking — shift it outwards by one setting or convert it into a removable, movable type. If this issue is left unaddressed, once a PSCO climbs up and takes measurements at any port, the deficiency will start at code 17. In serious cases, it may even be escalated to code 30.

Reference Example: Removable and Movable Guardrail

As of 19 October, no specific disclosed CIC securing deficiency cases have been released via public channels by other MSA branches. Please forward any relevant cases to the editor for reference if you come across them. The absence of public disclosures does not imply a lack of inspections; such information remains for internal use only. The CIC campaign will continue for another two months. Keep up the good work!

------------------------------------------Reprinted from PSCReady