On May 6th, PSCReady compiled 10 typical cases released by the Maritime Safety Administration since the launch of the special campaign on electrical and mechanical systems. The article garnered over 9,900 views. Such mundane and technical content achieving such impressive readership fully demonstrates the far-reaching impact and strong momentum of this campaign.

Given that the campaign will not conclude until October, and the Maritime Safety Administration has successively announced 8 latest detention cases, we have continued to collate them in this issue. We recommend all vessel operators conduct proactive self-inspections to smoothly pass this special campaign.

Case 1: Fuel Oil Tank Flooding Caused Main Engine Shutdown – The Vent Pipe Was to Blame! This case was provided by Lianyungang Maritime Safety Administration, with the details as follows: During a Port State Control (PSC) inspection of a 7,659 DWT general cargo ship (keel laid in June 1998), the vessel suffered an unprovoked total power failure. The crew immediately activated the standby No.1 generator out of anxiety, but unexpectedly, it also shut down two minutes later. They had no choice but to start the emergency generator. It was a stroke of luck for the PSC inspectors – a vessel worthy of detention literally came to them. Needless to say, the chief engineer must have been utterly devastated.

Multiple generator blackouts usually point to fuel oil issues. The crew conducted a self-inspection and drained the sludge from the daily service tank, only to find nothing but water. After draining continuously for quite a while, they restarted the generators, and all three units resumed normal operation.

Subsequently, the PSC team kindly assisted the vessel in identifying the water source of the daily service tank, which could only come from three channels:

1) Malfunctioning oil separator leading to water-contaminated oil (ruled out via self-inspection and review of alarm records);

2) Leakage in the daily service tank heating pipeline (ruled out after checking the boiler hot well);

3) Water ingress through the daily service tank vent pipe.

Upon inquiry with the bosun, it was revealed that before berthing, the crew had derusted, repainted and washed the vent pipe with water.

A further inspection after dismantling confirmed that the vent pipe had aged and allowed water to enter.

Some may ask: Aren't there requirements to prevent water ingress for the vent pipes of daily service tanks? That's absolutely correct. As stipulated in Regulation 26.11 of Chapter II-1 of the SOLAS Convention: Location and arrangement of vent pipes for fuel oil service, settling and lubrication oil tanks shall be such that in the event of a broken vent pipe this shall not directly lead to the risk of ingress of seawater splashes or rainwater. Two fuel oil service tanks for each type of fuel used on board necessary for propulsion and vital systems or equivalent arrangements shall be provided on each new ship, with a capacity of at least 8 h at maximum continuous rating of the propulsion plant and normal operating load at sea of the generator plant. This paragraph applies only to ships constructed on or after 1 July 1998.

To meet this requirement, ships adopt various configurations for vent pipe arrangements. For instance, an oil tank is connected to an inclined pipe via an inverted U-shaped pipe, which is then connected to an air pipe and linked to an overflow tank at the lower end. However, this design has a flaw: if the overflow tank is full, seawater will still enter the fuel oil tank through the overflow pipe. Alternatively, if it is not connected to an overflow tank, the pipe will lead to the bilge well.

Alternatively, the oil tank's gas gathering pipe can be connected to a common vent header with a gas collection box installed. A sludge drain line is fitted at the bottom of the box, leading back to the engine room bilge and equipped with a stop valve. The pipe runs through the engine room casing, terminates outside the funnel, and is simply fitted with an oil tank vent head. Photos of its internal and external layouts are shown below:

Water ingress into daily service oil tanks is a major issue. Therefore, please take a moment to check the vent pipes of your oil tanks and see what type they are. For ships constructed on or after July 1, 1998, if they do not meet the water ingress prevention requirements (i.e., the height of the liquid tank vent pipes on the freeboard deck is less than 760mm), and for ships with keel laid on or after January 1, 2005, if the air pipe openings are not equipped with automatic closing devices, urgent modifications must be carried out.

Let’s expand a bit more for PSC inspectors’ reference: After inspecting so many ships, I’ve found that the vent pipes of emergency generator fuel tanks are often configured with a straight pipe + vent head. This clearly ignores the SOLAS Convention requirement that "even if the vent pipe is damaged, it shall not allow splashing seawater or rainwater to enter the tank."

Most ships cannot withstand inspection on this item. All PSC seniors can identify this as a defect and practice your inspection skills!

Case 2: Unexpected Main Engine Shutdown – The Filter Was Initially Blamed, but PSC Pursued the Matter and Found It Was Only a Scapegoat!

This case was handled by Fujian Maritime Safety Administration.

A ro-ro foreign ship (built in November 2015) sailing on unlimited navigation areas suffered a main engine shutdown while entering Xiamen Port. With the assistance of tugboats, it berthed at the dock. The crew conducted a self-inspection and reported to the authorities that the shutdown was caused by low lube oil pressure due to contaminated filters in the hydraulic power supply system. They claimed the issue had been repaired and would not affect sailing.

In accordance with the special inspection procedures, PSC inspectors from Fujian Maritime Safety Administration boarded the ship for a detailed inspection and unexpectedly found 8 defects, 3 of which were related to electrical and mechanical equipment. It was highly likely that the ship would be detained.

The PSC inspectors maintained a modest and prudent attitude of skepticism towards the ship’s explanation for the incident.

First, they checked the alarm records in the central control room and found that the alarm panel displayed: "M/E common alarm from EICU" and "low hydraulic pressure."

The PSC inspectors failed to identify the root cause, so they ordered the crew to conduct a main engine test run. After the engine started, several rounds of ahead and astern operations triggered the same alarms on the panel again: "M/E common alarm from EICU" and "low hydraulic pressure".

This confirmed that the fault persisted even after the crew had cleaned the filters. At this stage of inspection, following the usual practice of Shanghai MSA, a defect would have been issued stating that the vessel’s fault report and the chief engineer’s on-site explanation were inconsistent with the evidence collected by the PSCOs.

It remains unclear how Fujian MSA worded their defect, but the vessel was definitely detained from sailing. The shipping company then arranged for a service engineer from MAN B&W, the main engine manufacturer, to board the vessel and troubleshoot the issue.

The service engineer, being a specialist, finally pinpointed the problem: the spring of the spool valve in No.310 overflow solenoid valve of the hydraulic power supply system had broken. This caused the overflow valve to remain permanently open, allowing hydraulic oil to flow directly back to the oil tank and preventing the hydraulic power supply system from building up pressure.

According to the main engine service provider's report, this incident occurred prior to April 5, when the special campaign had just kicked off. It shows that the campaign has set higher requirements for PSC inspectors, who are now required not only to identify defects but also to assist in pinpointing their root causes.

According to the official statement, maritime law enforcement officers shall, during the inspection of electrical and mechanical equipment, help vessels identify and resolve problems, track the whole process of equipment fault handling, identify deficiencies of the vessel in maintenance, safety management, emergency response and operational capabilities, put forward rational suggestions, reduce the probability of electrical and mechanical equipment failures, improve the crew's emergency response capabilities for such failures, and ensure the safety of vessel navigation.

Without real expertise, you can’t really do the PSC job well!

Case 3: Shanghai Baoshan MSA – Cooling Water May Seem Trivial, But Three Vessels Were Detained Over It!

On April 28, a river-sea direct container vessel experienced excessively low cooling seawater pressure at buoy 69# in Baoshan North Waterway, leading to overhigh cooling freshwater temperature and subsequent automatic main engine shutdown. In accordance with the procedures for the electrical and mechanical special campaign, FSC inspectors boarded the vessel for safety inspection shortly after.

The fault was relatively straightforward: low seawater pressure coupled with high freshwater temperature clearly indicated a problem with the seawater cooling system.

For such a fault, the standard procedure is to first disassemble and clean the sea water pump filter, then the sea chest filter. However, the chief engineer was afraid that the sea chest valve might not close tightly and dared not clean its filter. His concern was not unfounded, as many engine room flooding incidents have occurred due to sea chest disassembly and cleaning.

The inspector determined that the vessel had not fully resolved the cooling system issue, then issued a defect notice, requiring the crew to disassemble and clean the sea chest filter under safe conditions, identify the root cause of the low sea water pressure, and ensure the normal operation of the sea water cooling system.

With this official authorization and the backing of Baoshan MSA, the chief engineer gained much more confidence. Under shore-based guidance, he disassembled both the high and low sea chest filters and found them severely clogged. An inspection of the sea chest vent pipe also revealed a blockage; after cleaning, the problem was completely resolved.

This case was actually quite straightforward. Filters are supposed to be cleaned regularly, which suggests a lapse in the chief engineer's management. But one look at the engine room photo below really makes you feel for him.

This level of corrosion and working environment is a clear example of long-term lack of maintenance funding. It’s only prudent of the chief engineer to hesitate to clean the filters lightly—who can guarantee that the sea chest inlet valves are tightly shut?

According to Baoshan MSA, three recent main engine shutdown incidents caused by seawater cooling system failures have been identified, and the underlying reasons are thought-provoking.

Case 4: Even Power Grid Overload Was Detected – This PSCO Knows His Stuff!

This case was handled by Shenzhen MSA.

A large vessel with a deadweight of 176,435 tons was navigating the Shenzhen Western Waterway. Having just completed a course alteration, the ship suffered a generator failure and a total blackout. Upon boarding, PSC inspectors found that: upon entering the port, generators No.1, No.2 and No.4 were operating in parallel to supply power. During the course alteration, generator No.4 experienced a malfunction in its fuel injection control system, causing the prime mover to overspeed, which triggered an overspeed alarm and shut down the generator. Generator No.4 then tripped automatically, leaving generators No.1 and No.2 unable to meet the vessel’s power load demand. This led to a power grid overload and a total ship blackout.

As seen in the photo, this case dates back to 2023 and serves as an introduction. It was inspired by a brilliant defect-detection method based on load calculation developed by a PSCO from Shenzhen MSA. Shenzhen MSA further elaborated as follows:

In April 2024, when a PSCO from Shenzhen Maritime Safety Administration inspected the vessel "Y", it was found that the vessel was equipped with 4 generators, among which Generator No.1 was out of service due to a malfunction.

Subsequently, the PSCO requested the vessel to present its power load calculation sheet. Calculations showed that the total maximum power demand reaches 4231 kW when the vessel is under maneuvering navigation during arrival/departure with the bow thruster in operation.

The breakdown of the 4231 kW calculation is as follows: the vessel carries 80 containers, accounting for 11×80×0.65 = 572 kW; the bow thruster requires 3659 kW. The sum of these two figures gives the total of 4231 kW.

Accordingly, the PSC issued a defect stating that the vessel had not made special arrangements for arrival and departure operations with Generator No.1 out of service.

Some may ask: each generator has a power capacity of 2,100 kW and the vessel is equipped with four units. Even if one fails, the remaining three can still deliver 2,100×3 = 6,100 kW, which should be more than enough!

The PSC's insight lies in its adherence to Regulation 41 of Chapter II-1 of the SOLAS Convention, which requires that the capacity of the generator set shall be such that if any one generator set ceases to operate, the remaining sets can still supply power to equipment essential for normal propulsion and safety. Meanwhile, the minimum habitable conditions shall be maintained, covering at least cooking, heating, food refrigeration, mechanical ventilation, sanitation and fresh water supply.

The three generators can indeed meet the power demand when running simultaneously, but with one out of service, the available capacity drops to 4,200 kW, which is less than the required 4,231 kW. It is inferred that the PSC deemed the standby power capacity insufficient.

Subsequently, the vessel submitted preventive measures to ensure minimal power consumption, after which the PSC closed the defect.

Case 5: Another Incident of Water Ingress into the Daily Service Fuel Tank!

This case was handled by Dalian MSA.

During a dedicated inspection of electrical and mechanical systems, Dalian MSA inspectors first noticed that the pressure gauge of Generator No.1 was fluctuating. The crew claimed the gauge was faulty. The inspectors then ordered Generator No.2 to be started. After startup, Generator No.1 showed low fuel pressure, and three minutes later, Generators No.1 and No.2 shut down one after another, resulting in a total ship blackout.

Fortunately, the emergency generator started up smoothly 30 seconds later, proving it was in perfect working condition.

The PSCO then followed the standard procedure of getting to the bottom of the problem.

After a thorough inspection, the root cause was once again water ingress in the fuel oil. In Case 1 at the beginning of this article, we analyzed three possible causes of water ingress into the daily service fuel tank. This time, both the crew and inspectors agreed that the incident was caused by inadequate sludge draining of the daily service tank.

However, it is speculated that this incident was most likely also caused by water entering through the vent pipe. For analysis, please refer to Case 1. It is recommended that the vessel's crew disassemble the vent pipe for inspection.

Case 6: Crankshaft Burned Out – Don’t Worry. It’s Just a Small Vessel!

On April 29, FSCO inspectors from Hainan Maritime Safety Administration boarded a small 498 GT vessel. Its Weichai main engine had suffered burned-out bearings, primarily caused by a broken wire in the engine's lubricating oil pressure sensor, which disabled the main engine's protection function.

Maintenance of such small vessels is hard to put into words, so we won’t elaborate. Suffice it to say that those engaged in maritime on-site supervision shoulder a heavy responsibility.

Case 7: The PSC sector is incredibly competitive – Fujian MSA has cracked another case!

This case was also handled by Fujian MSA.

In Case 2, Fujian MSA identified a fault: the spring of the spool valve in the No.310 overflow solenoid valve of the hydraulic power supply system had broken. This time, they uncovered a problem with the cylinder head gasket.

The PSC profession is truly highly competitive, and it's not for everyone.

When a vessel was entering port, it suddenly suffered a malfunction of the main engine cylinder head air starting valve, leading to mixed gas leakage.

After anchoring in an emergency, PSC inspectors boarded the vessel for inspection. Having reviewed documents including the engine department's vessel maintenance plan, maintenance records of relevant equipment and the maintenance manual for the cylinder head air starting valve, and taking into account the following facts: the total running hours of the main engine reached 40,118 when the fault occurred; the total running hours stood at 34,261 during the last overhaul and maintenance of the main engine cylinder head air starting valve; the main engine had only operated 5,857 hours since the last overhaul and maintenance of the air starting valve, with 12,000 hours still remaining until the maintenance interval specified in the air starting valve maintenance manual, they reached a unanimous conclusion that the cause of this incident was:

1. During the last maintenance, the two locking bolts of the starting valve core were not fitted with lock washers as required.

2. During the last maintenance, the two locking bolts of the core of the faulty air starting valve were not tightened to the specified torque.

This is truly impressive. Without rich experience, you could never pinpoint the root cause with such unanimous certainty right off the bat. You can’t really spot this lock washer issue unless you’ve worked as a chief engineer or a service engineer for years.

Case 8: Boiler Safety Valves Are Always Grounds for Detention!

This case was handled by Fangcheng MSA.

On April 15, during a PSC inspection of vessel "J**", Fangcheng. MSA identified 7 deficiencies, including a detention item of safety valve malfunction. The PSC’s defect description at that time was: One boiler safety valve out of order.

The deficiency was simple: the boiler was fitted with two safety valves, one of which was faulty.

The PSC adopted the following test method: pull the lanyards to test both safety valves. One valve failed to reset after its lifting gear was fully lifted (Figure 1), while the other functional safety valve (Figure 2) returned to its original position after multiple attempts.

This deficiency was grounded in Regulation 32 of Chapter II-1 of the SOLAS Convention. There are 6 sub-paragraphs under Regulation 32, covering all PSC inspection items for boilers.

1.At least one physical water gauge and one safety valve shall be installed; the other may be a device displayed in the central control room.

2.For automatically controlled boilers, three alarms (low water level, air supply failure and flame-out) are mandatory, and the crew must be able to test them.

3.Two independent water supply systems shall be provided.

4.The crew must master the testing method for boiler water. This item is not checked by many PSCOs, but once checked, any non-compliance will lead to serious consequences.

5.You can check your own boiler against the four points above to see if there are any problems.

The above are the 8 latest official cases released by maritime authorities, hoping they will be helpful to you.

--------------------------------Reprinted from PSCReady